Screenshot from the podcast with Ed Hoskins

Clintel Foundation
Date: 11 October 2026

Capacity factors

Hoskins begins with what he considers the fundamental problem with wind and solar: their relatively low capacity factors. This measures the electricity actually generated over a period compared with the amount that would be produced if a facility operated continuously at its rated capacity.

According to the figures, European solar installations have achieved an average capacity factor of only about 11%, while offshore wind performs considerably better than onshore wind. Hoskins estimates that the combined productivity of European wind and solar installations has fallen from around 20% in 2020 to approximately 15% in more recent data. He regards this decline as particularly troubling given the enormous sums invested in expanding renewable capacity.

By contrast, conventional power stations can operate at much higher capacity factors. Hoskins cites figures in the high 80s and 90s for gas, coal and nuclear installations, although actual performance varies between plants and over time.

The distinction is important, he argues, because installed capacity figures can create a misleading impression of how much electricity a system can reliably deliver. A gigawatt of solar panels is not equivalent to a gigawatt of dependable generating capacity. Wind and solar installations must be considerably larger to produce the same annual quantity of electricity as conventional power stations, and their output remains dependent on weather conditions.

Policymakers have focused too heavily on the nominal capacity of renewable installations while paying insufficient attention to their actual output.

Intermittency and backup

Low average productivity is only part of the challenge. Wind and solar generation cannot necessarily be increased when demand rises or reduced when supply exceeds demand. Electricity systems must therefore accommodate substantial fluctuations in output.

Hoskins argues that reliable generating capacity must remain available to compensate for periods when wind and solar production is insufficient. This means retaining gas, coal or nuclear generation alongside renewable installations, rather than assuming that intermittent sources can simply replace conventional power stations.

Surplus renewable electricity can also be difficult to use when production exceeds demand or the network cannot transport it to consumers. Conversely, shortages can arise when electricity is needed most.

To illustrate the problem, Hoskins examines wind generation in Britain, Germany and France during August and September 2023. He identifies a period of approximately 42 days when wind output was substantially below its annual average, including five days when generation across much of Western Europe was exceptionally low.

For the wind capacity he examines, average output was about 23% of installed capacity over the year. During the 42-day period, productivity fell to approximately 11%, and during the five-day interval it dropped below 6%.

Hoskins estimates that the resulting shortfall amounted to roughly 15,000 gigawatt-hours over the longer period, with a deficit of approximately 2,500 gigawatt-hours during the five particularly weak days, relative to the benchmark he uses. He then considers what battery storage would be required to compensate for such deficits. The broader point, is that storing electricity across prolonged periods of low wind generation presents a formidable challenge.

Energy return on investment

Hoskins next examines energy return on energy invested, or EROI: the amount of energy a technology delivers relative to the energy required to build, install, maintain and support it.

He contends that wind and solar perform substantially worse on this measure than conventional generation, while nuclear power performs particularly well. Biomass also fares poorly in his assessment.

His argument is that an energy source must produce a substantial surplus beyond the energy consumed in creating and operating the infrastructure. Otherwise, the economic and industrial resources available to society are reduced by the effort required to maintain energy production itself.

Hoskins concludes that solar power performs especially badly in his calculations, while onshore wind provides only a relatively modest energy surplus. Nuclear and fossil-fuel generation provide a more substantial return.

These conclusions depend on the boundaries and assumptions used in calculating EROI, including how construction, fuel production, storage, backup and grid infrastructure are accounted for. Nevertheless, Hoskins considers the comparison essential to understanding the real costs of different technologies.

Germany’s nuclear shutdown

Germany’s decision to close its remaining nuclear power stations in 2023 serves as a prominent example of what Hoskins sees as the political rejection of effective low-carbon electricity generation.

Nuclear power had previously supplied a substantial share of German electricity. Hoskins notes that it had accounted for approximately a quarter of the country’s electricity generation around a decade earlier. He argues that closing these plants removed a large source of electricity that could operate independently of weather conditions.

In his view, the decision was particularly difficult to justify in a country simultaneously pursuing emissions reductions and expanding intermittent renewable generation. He suggests that political hostility towards nuclear energy, rather than a straightforward assessment of engineering performance, played a decisive role.

Hoskins also mentions the possibility of reopening some retired plants, while expressing uncertainty about whether this would be feasible.

The overlooked emissions and land requirements

The podcast also examines the emissions associated with constructing electricity-generation infrastructure. Hoskins argues that the carbon footprint of manufacturing and installing wind turbines and solar panels should be considered alongside emissions during operation.

He points to the energy-intensive production of solar panels, including manufacturing in China, where coal-fired electricity remains important. Wind turbines also require substantial quantities of steel, concrete and other materials. Hydropower infrastructure can have a significant material footprint because of its concrete requirements.

Biomass receives particular criticism. Hoskins argues that imported wood pellets require harvesting, processing, drying, pelletising and shipping, all of which consume energy. He cites an estimate suggesting that the associated emissions can be nearly four times those of gas generation in the comparison he uses.

He therefore rejects the assumption that biomass should automatically be treated as carbon-neutral simply because new trees might eventually absorb some of the carbon released. The timing of regrowth and the emissions associated with the entire supply chain, he argues, matter when assessing its climate impact.

Land use is another concern. Hoskins maintains that solar farms occupy substantial areas that might otherwise be used for agriculture. He is particularly concerned about the concrete foundations and other infrastructure installed across farmland, which he believes could complicate its agricultural use after a solar installation reaches the end of its life.

Wind farms require access roads, foundations and additional infrastructure, although land between turbines may remain available for farming. Because renewable installations are widely distributed, Hoskins also argues that they require expanded electricity networks, transformers and other supporting equipment.

In his assessment, these indirect requirements are often neglected when renewable technologies are compared with large conventional power stations concentrated at relatively compact sites.

Construction costs, operating lifetimes and the economics of electricity

Hoskins uses cost estimates from the US Energy Information Administration, combined with observed capacity factors, to compare capital expenditure and longer-term costs across generation technologies.

His principal contention is that comparisons based solely on the cost of installing a unit of capacity conceal the productivity gap. Onshore wind and solar may appear competitive with gas-fired generation when initial construction costs are considered in isolation. Offshore wind, meanwhile, is expensive from the outset.

But Hoskins argues that the picture changes dramatically when costs are adjusted for actual electricity production. In his calculations, onshore wind becomes approximately six times as expensive as gas generation, offshore wind about 15 times as expensive, and solar nearly ten times as expensive in the comparison he presents.

His longer-term comparisons also incorporate the different expected operating lifetimes of the technologies. Hoskins uses approximate lifetimes of 25 years for onshore wind, 20 years for offshore wind and 18 years for solar panels. By comparison, he suggests that gas plants may operate for 50 years, coal plants for 60 years and nuclear plants for 70 years, with some hydropower facilities lasting even longer.

Shorter lifetimes mean renewable infrastructure must be replaced more frequently, potentially adding to its lifetime costs.

When comparing long-term costs while accounting for productivity, Hoskins estimates that offshore wind can cost nearly four times as much as nuclear power, while solar costs approximately twice as much. Onshore wind, in his calculations, approaches nuclear power in cost when productivity is taken into account.

These are Hoskins’s own comparisons rather than universal estimates of the cost of electricity. Results can vary with financing, location, fuel prices, technology, system integration and the assumptions used to allocate costs. His argument, however, is that such factors must be evaluated consistently before policymakers declare one technology cheaper than another.

A political failure to do the sums?

Hoskins believes renewable energy has benefited from claims that it is dramatically cheaper than conventional generation. He disputes these claims, arguing that they fail to account adequately for actual output, backup requirements, infrastructure, replacement costs and other practical constraints.

He points to 2025 installation figures for Germany and Britain, arguing that the differences in capacity factors mean renewable systems require several times more installed capacity to achieve comparable electricity production. His estimates suggest roughly eight times as much renewable capacity would be needed in Germany and six times as much in Britain, on the basis of the comparison he presents.

For Hoskins, this is evidence that energy policy has been driven by political ambition without sufficient attention to basic calculations.

He invokes the work of the late David MacKay, the physicist and former scientific adviser to the UK Department of Energy, whose book Sustainable Energy – Without the Hot Air emphasised quantitative analysis of energy choices. Hoskins concludes: “Humanity really does need to pay attention to the arithmetic and the laws of physics.”

He argues that the sums involved in Europe’s energy transition amount to trillions of dollars and that a more rigorous assessment could have prevented expensive policy mistakes.

Climate change and the future role of CO2

In the podcast’s closing section, Hoskins turns from energy economics to climate science. He argues that the future warming effect of additional atmospheric carbon dioxide is limited by diminishing returns as concentrations increase. He also emphasises the role of water vapour in the atmospheric greenhouse effect.

Hoskins uses these points to question whether the expected climate benefits justify the economic costs of the energy transition. He suggests that Western countries may have weakened their economies and energy security by pursuing policies based on exaggerated fears of global warming.

His conclusions are strongly critical of mainstream climate policy. His central challenge is clear: governments should evaluate energy technologies on the basis of the electricity they actually deliver, their full system costs, their material requirements and their useful lifetimes—not simply their installed capacity or their political appeal.

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